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Introduction 22 
The illegal wildlife trade has become increasingly sophisticated and poaching of wildlife, 23 
including elephants and rhinoceros, is rising (Burn et al. 2011; Biggs et al. 2013; Wittemyer et al. 24 
2014) . The London Declaration, signed in February 2014 by 46 countries, calls for four basic 25 
actions to tackle the problem: eradicating markets for illegal wildlife products; ensuring effective 26 
legal frameworks and deterrents; strengthening law enforcement; and promoting sustainable 27 
livelihoods and development. It backs these with a £10 million fund from the UK Government.  28 
The Declaration proposes a broad palette of action, but that breadth is threatened by growing 29 
calls for stronger armed responses to poaching from a wide range of conservation NGOs 30 
(including leading international organisations) and national governments (including the US 31 
Government, Duffy, forthcoming 2015; White, 2014). We argue that these calls could be 32 
counter-productive because they are founded on limited knowledge about poverty and poaching, 33 
inadequately address rising wealth in user markets (Ayling, 2013; Roe et al, 2014), make 34 
oversimplified claims that trafficking is funding terrorism (White, 2014), and do not adequately 35 
consider demand reduction strategies.  36 
 37 
The shifting drivers of poaching 38 
Poaching is changing because of changing patterns of wealth in demand countries, the dynamics 39 
of poverty in supply countries and the interplay between them. In debates about the relationships 40 
between poverty, poaching and conservation, there is an underlying assumption that the poor 41 
poach to raise their income in situations where they have limited alternatives (Roe 2008). 42 
Poaching cannot be understood merely as a response to material deprivation. It is also driven by 43 
prestige, identity and custom (MacDonald 2004). Attempts to combat poaching through 44 
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livelihood enhancement that do not engage with these realities will founder (Alexander and 45 
McGregor 2000). If we say that poverty drives poaching, we must recognise too that poverty is 46 
multi-dimensional, encompassing lack of power, prestige, voice, and an inability to shape one’s 47 
future (Sen 1999; Hulme, 2010).   48 
 49 
Recent increases in poaching are more closely related to increases in wealth in demand countries, 50 
rather than poverty in supply countries. Recent reports from CITES and TRAFFIC-ASIA suggest 51 
that new drivers of the illegal wildlife trade are part of a shift from traditional culture-related 52 
consumption to new forms of conspicuous consumption driven by rising incomes. In the 1980s 53 
and 1990s key markets for rhino horn were Taiwan, Yemen, and to a lesser extent, China. Rhino 54 
horn was primarily used in Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) as a cardio-tonic and blood 55 
thinner (rather like aspirin in Western medicine) and as jambiyya dagger handles in Yemen (a 56 
marker of status). The market for horn in Yemen has reduced because of economic decline there, 57 
and following a national ban Taiwan is no longer significant (Ayling, 2013; Milliken and Shaw, 58 
2012). Now, the rising markets are in Vietnam and China: as wealth increases a greater number 59 
of people can afford to purchase products that contain rhino horn. However, this only provides 60 
part of the explanation. Certainly in Vietnam, increased demand is also linked to new patterns of 61 
consumption and groups of consumers. Prior to 2006 use of rhino horn in Vietnam was limited. 62 
However, demand increased following the comments of a prominent politician who thought it 63 
alleviated his cancer (Rademeyer, 2013: 275). The price of rhino horn in Vietnam in 2013 was 64 
US$65,000 per kilogram, and sometimes US$ 75,000 (Ayling, 2013: 60). Rhino horn also began 65 
to be used as a form of conspicuous consumption as a ‘party drink’ that did not result in a 66 
hangover and was thought to fortify male strength. Although never originally an aphrodisiac 67 
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(which was a Western myth), that myth has now gone full circle and Vietnamese consumers now 68 
refer to it in these terms (Rademeyer, 2013: 274-276). In late 2014 the Humane Society 69 
International claimed that consumption of rhino horn had reduced by 33% partly as a result of 70 
their campaigns, however this was based on a small study and Vietnam remains the biggest 71 
market for rhino horn (Humane Society International, 2014). Clearly then, the demand in 72 
Vietnam blends rising incomes, historical health practices, emerging cultural norms, conspicuous 73 
consumption as well as state level corruption (Litchfield 2013; Milliken and Shaw, 2012; Ayling, 74 
2013). 75 
 76 
Anti-poaching as a global security initiative  77 
Appropriate policy responses to these threats may be impeded by the ways that poaching is 78 
linked to issues of global security. A good example is the link drawn between poaching and Al 79 
Shabaab which can be traced back to a single investigation by the Elephant Action League 80 
(Kalron & Crosta 2012; also see White, 2014). Posted on their website in 2012, their report was 81 
only picked up by international media after the attacks on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall in 2013.  82 
Since then, claims linking Al Shabaab to wildlife trafficking have been made in diverse fora 83 
including testimonial to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (US Senate Committee 84 
on Foreign Relations 2012), the UK’s Chatham House (Lawson & Vines 2014), meetings of the 85 
International Conservation Caucus Foundation (Barron 2013) and media reports (Doshi 2014). 86 
More broadly Hilary Clinton (US Secretary of State, 2009-2013) and Barack Obama (US 87 
President, 2009-present) have made public statements drawing links between wildlife trafficking, 88 
poaching and global security (Goldenberg 2013; The White House 2013). The idea that ivory 89 
poaching funds terrorism thus circulates in high political circles, but it does so on a paucity of 90 
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clear evidence and using simplifications of a complex political economy of poaching. Somali 91 
groups have long been identified as a possible source of ivory poaching in Kenya, while at the 92 
same time poaching activities have also been linked to corruption within the Kenyan 93 
Government itself (Leakey & Morell 2002).  94 
 95 
These simplifications matter because where militias and insurgent groups are involved in ivory 96 
poaching, it is only part of a wider military strategy – and hence so must counter-poaching 97 
strategies. Poaching has been used as a financial underpinning for conflicts across Sub-Saharan 98 
Africa, including Uganda in the 1970s and 1980s, Angola and Mozambique in the 1980s, the 99 
Great Lakes region since 1996, and the Central African Republic and its neighbours more 100 
recently (Humphreys and Smith, 2011; Ellis, 1994). Solutions to poaching must engage with 101 
issues of broader regional stability and the wider political context (Milburn, 2012; Lunstrum, 102 
2014). 103 
 104 
There are also serious ethical concerns. More forceful actions against poaching can lead to 105 
injustices (Neumann 2004) - an important omission in Challender and MacMillan’s (2014) 106 
review of poaching and policy responses, which does not focus on how more aggressive 107 
approaches to enforcement are made possible by policy debates. Shoot-to-kill policies are legal 108 
in some states (e.g. Botswana and Uganda), contrary to the principles of the Conservation 109 
Initiative on Human Rights (CIHR) to which many in the conservation community aspire (IIED, 110 
2015).  111 
 112 
 113 
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Undermining long term goals 114 
Strong and forceful approaches to conservation can work (Brockington 2002). Specifically, there 115 
is evidence that greater levels of patrolling reduced poaching in the Serengeti (Hilborn et al. 116 
2006). However, the same authors are clear that their analyses do not provide evidence that 117 
better armed rangers, or greater use of force, would be more effective. Instead, militarized 118 
approaches can escalate conflict between rangers and poachers, and lead to the alienation of local 119 
communities. 120 
 121 
Arresting more poachers does not always stop criminal syndicates. In South Africa rhino 122 
poaching continued to rise despite increased arrests (Standley & Emslie 2013; Milliken and 123 
Shaw 2012; Rademeyer, 2012). Where poaching is the consequence of organized criminal 124 
networks and global commodity chains, tackling just one end of the chain will have limited 125 
impact (Duffy et al. 2013; Rademeyer, 2012). We need to be cognizant of the fact that the illegal 126 
wildlife trade is not a singular phenomenon that requires a one-size-fits-all strategy to tackle it. 127 
Illegal hunting and wildlife trading play a central role in the subsistence strategies of many 128 
communities around the world (Roe et al, 2014). The strategies for tackling subsistence hunting 129 
need to be quite different to those for commercial scale poaching of high value products. Other 130 
approaches seek to reduce demand in end-user markets (Zain, 2012) as an effective strategy. 131 
There are arguments in favour of formal legalisation and monitoring of wildlife trades (e.g. of 132 
rhino horn, Biggs et al, 2013) but these do not adequately address important considerations of the 133 
relative roles of wealth, poverty and inequality. Clearly, different trades might require very 134 
different policy responses according to species, place of origin, trade and transit route and profile 135 
of demand. 136 
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 137 
Conclusion 138 
The breadth of the London Declaration is welcome. A key issue is what sort of impact it makes 139 
on policy and practice, based on what sort of understandings of the problem. Important measures 140 
of success will include the long-term solutions that it fosters, and the extent to which it tackles 141 
poaching within the broader political, social and economic context of which it is part.  Efforts to 142 
reduce poaching need to engage with the broader political economy of the wildlife trade – 143 
notably how wealth (rather than poverty) drives demand and structures markets and trade.  144 
Reducing demand from consumers needs a complex combination of carefully designed 145 
awareness campaigns, leadership from involved actors, as well as systems of incentives and 146 
penalties. On previous experience this will require commitments over several decades from all 147 
stakeholders, not just more enforcement in supply countries.   148 
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